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Abstract
Persistent therapy is the continuation of treatment despite having assessed the patient’s clinical condition as showing 
no prospect of improvement, having exhausted all available treatment options and having found that continued the-
rapy would extend the patient’s suffering with no chance of improvement. Persistent therapy is an exception from the 
physician’s obligation to provide medical assistance in each case when a delay could result in the threat of loss of life, 
serious bodily injury or serious health disorder.
Provisions of Polish law do not provide for any special procedure for consent by an authorized body (e.g., court) for di-
scontinuation of treatment as the result of a finding of no medical indications for its continuation. Accordingly, it rests 
upon the medical staff to make and implement the decision in this regard. This includes first and foremost making 
a collective decision, reflecting all circumstances relating to the patient’s clinical condition in the medical records, and 
giving effect in practice to the patient’s rights — including the right to be informed about the condition of one’s health, 
to give informed consent to the provision of medical service, and to die peacefully and with dignity — as appropriate 
given the patient’s state of consciousness.
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There is no definition of persistent therapy in Poland’s legal 
system. At present, the term appears in Article 32 of the 
Code of Medical Ethics [1] (hereinafter ‘CME’), whereby in 
terminal conditions the physician is not required to under-
take and conduct resuscitation or persistent therapy and 
use extraordinary measures, provided that the decision 
to discontinue resuscitation belongs to the physician and 
involves the assessment of chances of a cure. This is an 
exception from the physician’s obligation to provide medical 
assistance in each case when a delay could present the 
threat of loss of life, serious bodily injury or serious health 
disorder [2].
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In the context of the physician’s right to discontinue the 
treatment, it is impossible not to mention the connection 
with the patient’s rights. First, the patient’s right to receive 
medical services should be mentioned [7]. The patient has 
a right to receive medical services corresponding to the 
current state of medical knowledge, whereas the physician 
is under a duty to practise his/her profession in line with 
the indications of up-to-date medical knowledge, available 
methods and means of prevention, diagnosis and treat-
ment of diseases by the principles of professional ethics 
and with the exercise of due diligence [8]. Discontinuation 
of persistent therapy is not tantamount to complete ces-
sation of the provision of medical services. For instance, 
steps will be taken to alleviate the pain (by administration 
of appropriate medicines and use of medical products) or 
provide care (hydration, nourishment), which will satisfy 
the humanitarian requirements in respect of reducing the 
painfulness and harshness of death to the extent possible.
Inextricable from the patient’s right to receive medical 
services is the right to die peacefully and with dignity 
[9]. Protecting the dignity of death means respecting 
the patient in the last stage of life, excluding either the 
acceleration of death (euthanasia) or its protraction by 
so-called ‘persistent therapy’ [10]. Here, the right to 
dignity includes freedom from persistent therapy, the 
right to alleviate the pain and other sufferings, the right 
to consent to or refuse proposed therapy, and the pro-
tection of so-called information autonomy [11]. By this 
right, the patient is entitled to expect medical personnel 
to respect his or her dignity by recognizing in the patient’s 
person a coequal participant in human interaction, that 
is to respect the patient’s subjectivity [12]. Thus, this 
right guarantees the patient the cessation of therapy 
if it continued to be futile but also the inclusion of the 
patient in the decision-making.
Besides the right to die with dignity and the right 
to receive medical services, an important right for the 
patient and corresponding obligation for the physician is 
the obligation to provide information about the patient’s 
condition [13]. The scope of such information, in line with 
the applicable provisions of law, must include information 
about the patient’s condition, diagnosis, proposed and 
possible diagnostic and therapeutic methods, expectable 
consequences of their use or omission, the outcome of 
treatment, and prognosis [14]. In the light of court deci-
sions, the duty to provide the appropriate information is 
an integral part of the physician’s obligations relating to 
the therapeutic process itself. The correct fulfilment of 
the obligation to inform is a necessary precondition of the 
patient’s ability to give informed consent for the decided 
treatment (‘informed consent’ or ‘conscious consent’), 
and the inefficacy of consent given as a result of being 
provided with incorrect or incomplete information makes 
the physician’s conduct unlawful [15].
Persistent therapy is inextricably linked with the con-
cept of terminal condition and terminal stage (terminal 
phase, end-stage). In literature, a terminal condition is 
defined as an irretrievable condition caused by a trauma 
or illness having caused progressing, serious and perma-
nent deterioration of health with the resulting medically 
substantiated belief that any therapy would be futile [3]. 
Literature also distinguishes the concept of the terminal 
stage, which is the end stage of the life of an incurably ill 
patient, when death is beyond any doubt expected to follow 
in the closest days [4]. Close synonyms in popular use 
among medical staff include ‘terminal patient’, ‘terminally 
ill’ or simply ‘terminal illness’. The common denominator in 
all these terms is the fact that in keeping with the current 
state of medical knowledge this is a permanent incurable 
condition that will lead to the patient’s demise.
Accordingly, persistent therapy will be the continuation 
of treatment despite having assessed the patient’s con-
dition as showing zero chance of improvement, having 
exhausted all available treatment options and having 
found that continued therapy would extend the patient’s 
suffering with no chance of improvement. In line with the 
CME in such a situation the physician has the right, but 
not obligation, to discontinue the treatment. Discontinu-
ation of treatment must not be confused with omission, 
which, in criminal law, is dependent on the existence of 
the perpetrator’s special duty to prevent the consequ-
ences of an event and may provide the basis for holding 
the perpetrator criminally liable in particular for failure to 
render assistance [5]. Article 162(1) of the Polish Criminal 
Code (CC) implies the existence of an obligation to render 
assistance to a person in direct danger of loss of life or 
severe health impairment, and this obligation exists only 
at the time when such assistance is possible (whatever 
the expected effectiveness might be) and does not pose 
a danger to the person providing assistance or to others, 
to the extent defined in the last part of the provision. The 
obligation to render assistance to a person in direct dan-
ger of loss of life or severe health impairment, therefore, 
begins with the occurrence of the state of threat to the 
interests referred to in Article 162(1) CC and ends with the 
provision of assistance by a specialized entity, cessation 
of the threat, or death of the person in danger [6]. Thus, if 
deciding to discontinue persistent therapy, the grounds for 
such a decision must be sufficiently demonstrated. Those 
will in particular include the exhaustion of all available 
treatment options, absence of prospects of improvement, 
and extension of the patient’s suffering in the event of con-
tinuation of therapy. Ineffectiveness of treatment from the 
perspective of improvement should not in itself provide the 
sole criterion for deciding that continued treatment would 
be persistent therapy. A significant element here is the link 
between continued therapy and the patient’s suffering, as 
well as violation of the patient’s dignity.
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In the vast majority of cases, however, discontinuation 
of therapy refers to patients whose condition precludes 
them from giving informed consent (unconscious or 
unable to communicate). Accordingly, there is no way of 
effectively providing information about the patient’s he-
alth condition. Thus, the patient is in no position to give 
informed consent or object to the inclusion of persistent 
therapy or discontinuation of already initiated procedures. 
What is necessary in such a case is to determine whether 
the patient has made a pro-futuro declaration (‘living will’) 
concerning the lack of consent to therapy or life support 
in a condition showing no prospect for improvement or 
has appointed an attorney to make such decisions. In the 
absence of such information, the matter of any persistent 
therapy should be decided together with the legal repre-
sentative or a person who is close to the patient. Here, 
it is necessary to highlight the inappropriate practice of 
restricting access to information and failure to provide 
information about potential methods of treatment in 
those situations where, by the current state of medical 
knowledge, the foregoing has a high probability of not 
achieving the expected result. Both the patient and the 
close person have a right to be given comprehensive in-
formation allowing them to fully comprehend the patient’s 
condition and make their informed decision concerning 
(consent to) further treatment.
Regardless, the ethical, moral and legal burden of de-
ciding on the use of the therapy will be incumbent on the 
physician participating in the decision-making. Accordingly, 
the recommendation for such cases is to consult, in so far 
as possible, with a different physician, of the same spe-
ciality if possible, or some other speciality appropriate for 
the relevant case, to arrive at the decision ‘by committee’, 
exercise due diligence and share the burden of responsi-
bility for the decision.
The patient’s informed consent is a crucial element 
in the decision-making process on the continuation or 
discontinuation of persistent therapy. In principle, the 
direction of the medical proceedings is to be decided by 
the physician; however, obtaining a statement of will from 
the patient or the patient’s attorney-in-fact appointed for 
such decisions or a close person consenting or objecting 
to any further medical actions, is a necessary condition 
for the conduct of these proceedings.
As regards the patient’s will, it must be noted that 
the right of self-determination is not absolute but may 
be subject to limitations, though only when prompted by 
a different constitutional rule, principle or value (interest) 
and the degree of limitation is adequately proportionate to 
the importance of the interest supporting it. In criminal law, 
treatment without consent is defined as an independent 
offence [Article 192(1) CC]. The lack of consent preceded 
by the receipt of information renders the medical activity 
unlawful [16]. Court decisions indicate that we can only 
speak of the patient’s consent when before giving it the 
patient had received sufficient and understandable infor-
mation as defined in Article 31(1) o the Act of 1996 on 
the Profession of Physician, that is information about the 
condition of the patient’s health, diagnosis, proposed and 
possible diagnostic and therapeutic methods, expectable 
consequences of their use or omission, the outcome of 
treatment, and prognosis. The above knowledge is a ne-
cessary element of the patient’s consent to a specific 
course of treatment. Consent not preceded by discernment 
is deemed to be incomplete [17].
Thus, the patient, as long as being conscious, should 
receive complete information about his or her condition, 
including all of the above-listed elements. The same infor-
mation should be given to the legal representative, a per-
son close to the patient or the attorney-in-fact appointed 
for treatment decisions when it is not possible to obtain 
effective consent from the patient. The Polish legal system 
does not provide for any particular procedure enabling the 
court to make any specific decision in this matter [18]. The 
law only provides for the court’s involvement in a closed 
list of cases concerning in particular the patient’s consent 
to a high-risk procedure. They, however, do not provide for 
a judicial decision to be made in cases concerning the 
discontinuation of treatment in consequence of a finding 
of lack of medical grounds to continue it. Such a procedure 
would enable the verification of the physician’s decision 
by a judicial authority extrinsic to the healthcare establish-
ment. But since there is no such procedure, the decision 
is incumbent solely on the physicians.
It must be emphasized that at each time the analysis 
and verification of the grounds for the exercise of the 
right under Article 32 CME should be reflected in medi-
cal records. The entry should contain detailed medical 
rationale provided by the physician exercising the right, 
including without limitation notes from consultants and 
examinations, about outcomes of further treatment and 
predicted results of the therapy, as well as accounting 
for the patient’s consciousness and ability to express the 
patient’s will in a sufficient manner concerning the use of 
persistent therapy.
In summary, the above analysis shows that persistent 
therapy is a medically, legally and ethically complex set 
of problems. Plenty of obligations and responsibilities are 
placed on the physicians’ shoulders. The matter is made 
all the more difficult by the fact that there is no definition 
of persistent therapy in the current legislation, nor is there 
any court procedure of the kind present in many European 
jurisdictions. In the context of the multiple obligations 
incumbent on medical staff it is of primary importance 
to give effect to the patient’s rights including the right to 
receive information about one’s condition, to give consent 
to receive medical services, and the right to die peacefully 
and with dignity.
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Streszczenie
Uporczywa terapia to kontynuowanie leczenia mimo dokonania oceny stanu klinicznego i stwierdzenia braku szans na 
poprawę zdrowia, wyczerpania dostępnych możliwości terapii oraz określenia, że jej prowadzenie przedłużałoby cier-
pienia pacjenta bez realnej szansy na poprawę stanu zdrowia. Stanowi ona wyjątek od obowiązku lekarza udzielania 
pomocy lekarskiej w każdym przypadku, gdy zwłoka w jej udzieleniu mogłaby spowodować niebezpieczeństwo utraty 
życia, ciężkiego uszkodzenia ciała lub ciężkiego rozstroju zdrowia.
W przepisach polskiego prawa nie przewidziano szczególnej procedury związanej z wyrażeniem zgody przez uprawnio-
ny organ (np. sąd) na zaprzestanie leczenia w wyniku stwierdzenia braku wskazań medycznych do jego kontynuacji. 
W związku z tym na personelu lekarskm spoczywa zarówno podjęcie decyzji w tym przedmiocie, jak i jej wdrożenie. 
Powyższe obejmuje przede wszystkim podjęcie decyzji w sposób gremialny, odnotowanie wszelkich okoliczności zwią-
zanych ze stanem klinicznym w dokumentacji medycznej, a także zastosowanie w praktyce praw pacjenta obejmujących 
prawo do informacji o stanie zdrowia, do wyrażenia świadomej zgody na udzielenie świadczenia zdrowotnego, godnego 
umierania w spokoju i godności, przy uwzględnieniu stanu świadomości pacjenta.
Słowa kluczowe: uporczywa terapia, prawa pacjenta, obowiązki lekarza
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